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I.  前書き
　18世紀イギリスの政治家エドマンド・バーク（Edmund Burke）は，その後の美の哲学に多
大な影響を及ぼした。本稿は，彼の著作である『崇高と美の観念の起原』（1757）における記
憶の役割を分析対象とするが，これは筆者による研究の２番目の，かつ最後の部分である。現
在バークを感覚論者とする見方が有力であるが，この点についても本論文では再検討してい
る。バークは彼の芸術論において，18世紀の特にスコットランド啓蒙主義の理想に従い，趣味
判断の合理的根拠について論じている。彼はとりわけ我々の趣味は単に主観的なものであり，
また人によって様々であるように思われるが，それは単純に我々が年齢を重ねるにつれ嗜好が
不自然な連合作用によって撹乱されるためであるという。しかし，我々がバークの述べる「十
分な記憶 (sufficient remembrance)」を通して自然的な快の原因を想起するとしても，この自然
的な原因は我々の趣味判断を規制する普遍的な基準として機能する。本稿では，バークのこの
主張について様々な角度から検討した。
Keywords: Burke, aesthetics, remembrance, faculties, taste, sensationism
I.  Preface
　In keeping with the ideals of the eighteenth century and the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, 
Edmund Burke argues for the existence of rational grounds for the determination of taste in discussions 
of art. Burke argues that our tastes appear to be merely subjective and to vary widely from person to 
person only because, as we mature, our tastes are compromised by unnatural associations. However, 
could we, through what Burke calls sufficient remembrance, recall the natural causes of pleasure, these 
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natural causes would serve as a universal standard by which to regulate our judgments in matters of taste. 
My essay explores implications of this argument and rejects the characterization of Burke's conception 
of taste as being wholly based on sensations. It is the second and final part to my exploration of the role 
of memory in Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful.
II.  The Memory of Natural Sensations
　In "The Notion of Sufficient Remembrance in Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful,"1 I draw attention to an aspect of Burke's writings on 
taste that, however marginal in appearance, plays an important role within Burke's overall argument. 
What Burke refers to as a sufficient remembrance plays a mediating role whose conception helps 
Burke to tie together the various faculties of the mind as Burke describes them, namely, sensibility, 
imagination, and judgment. As Burke says, "There is in all men a sufficient remembrance of the original 
natural causes of pleasure, to enable them to bring all things offered to their senses to that standard, and 
to regulate their feelings and opinions by it" (16, my emphasis).2  Although Burke identifies the notion 
of sufficient remembrance explicitly in only this one passage from the Introduction on Taste, since only 
such remembrance is capable of assuring such a standard and regulation, it is worth exploring not only 
of what it consists and how exactly it functions, but also how specifically it relates to the faculties of 
the mind. In carrying out this interrogation, it becomes clear that the notion of sufficient remembrance 
is implied throughout Burke's Introduction on Taste. That is, without asserting that Burke consciously 
works out a full-blown concept, that "sufficient remembrance" itself constitutes a technical term, or 
that it represents a special category of memory, if one explores the implications of Burke's insistence 
on the universal function of memory (i.e., sufficient remembrance) with respect to his overall views 
on taste, one can no longer assert, in line with numerous other readers, that Burke's writings on taste 
are thoroughly "sensationist."3 One cannot defend the idea that Burke holds that judgments of taste 
are merely the product of physical sensations. Rather, one must confront the role that memory plays in 
capturing original sensations and in sustaining their mediated relation with the faculties.  
   Since sufficient remembrance retains exact and not merely similar copies of original, natural 
sensations, it allows for a retention or renewed encounter of the same, but only as mediated by the 
faculties. Its mediation is the process or means by which the faculties relate to one another. In this 
mediation, remembrance plays a distinct role. The explicit reason Burke gives for rejecting the idea that 
taste, ensured by remembrance, constitutes a faculty in itself is that it appears to combine within itself 
elements of the three distinct faculties: 
On the whole it appears to me, that what is called Taste, in its most general acceptation, is not 
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a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the 
secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning 
the various relations of these, and concerning the human passions, manners and actions. (23, my 
emphasis) 
We see here the relational function, the fact that taste concerns "the various relations of these" (faculties), 
which relations are clearly distinct from judgment's proper objects of attention—namely, human 
passions, manners, and actions. Thus, sufficient remembrance would not itself be a faculty. In what 
follows, I will make explicit its implicit characterization as a retained sensation by means of which the 
faculties relate to one another.  
　Consider, first, that in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,4 John Locke also invokes 
remembrance by contrasting it with recollection. One could speculate whether Burke reactivates this 
distinction and whether his contemporaries would have seen, and if today we should see, in Burke's 
idea of sufficient remembrance a harkening back to Locke, who writes: "The same idea, when it again 
recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance; if it be sought 
after by the mind, and with pain and endeavor found, and brought again in view, it is recollection."5 
However tempting this possible allusion to Locke, it is difficult to substantiate since, for Burke, the 
recurrence of the like object is not what engages sufficient remembrance but rather the repetition, in 
remembrance, of the same object or idea, if not simply one that is assuredly natural or original and not 
associative in nature. Nonetheless, this Lockean distinction between, on the one hand, the ease of a 
spontaneous, inward response to an exterior stimulus and, on the other, the arduous workings of a mind 
attempting to summon objects not immediately available to it, is not without resonance for Burke's 
treatment of sufficient remembrance. It points to the oscillating, if implicit, characterization of sufficient 
remembrance as being, at times, an innate capacity operating independently of the faculties and, at 
others, an operation dependent on a discerning judgment built through trial and error; at times, an innate 
process whose infallible nature would require it to take place simply and naturally (in accordance with 
the things that it is supposed to retain), and at others, a versatile and possibly protracted and heavily 
documented investigation into others' pains and pleasures, habits, distempers, prejudices, and like 
associations. From this perspective, we can say that sufficient remembrance, as a universal capacity, is 
what makes the Enquiry possible; but, at the same time, is what the Enquiry must mobilize by gathering 
for public consideration the pains and pleasures of a certain category of eighteenth-century British 
men—which sensations are, of course, presumed by Burke to be universal. 
　The insoluble tension between the ease or immediacy of a given process or capacity and its arduous 
and necessarily partial and incomplete mobilization through philosophical inquiry is everywhere 
in evidence in the Enquiry. Consider, for instance, that to counter certain Platonic and neoclassical, 
utilitarian assumptions concerning proportionality, it takes Burke four sections of the Enquiry to 
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demonstrate that proportionality does not belong in the catalogue of natural causes of beauty (92-104). 
Proportion, recalls Burke, like all ideas of order, concerns convenience and the understanding and so is 
not primarily of the senses; it is not recorded simply and naturally in sensibility; its commerce with the 
faculties is thus only partial. Proportion favors judgment disproportionately. This argument reveals the 
necessary, but not sufficient, empiricism of Burke's approach. Indeed, Burke often stresses the ease and 
simplicity of the operation by which sensibility is fed. This simplicity or even automaticity would appear 
to pre-empt or skirt judgment itself: "It is not by the force of long attention and enquiry that we find any 
object to be beautiful; beauty demands no assistance from our reasoning; even the will is unconcerned; 
the appearance of beauty as effectually causes some degree of love in us, as the application of ice or 
fire produces the ideas of heat or cold" (92). However, a few sentences after Burke states that the "true 
standard of the arts is in every man's power; and an easy observation of the most common, sometimes 
of the meanest things in nature, will give the truest lights, where the greatest sagacity and industry that 
slights such observation, must leave us in the dark, or what is worse, amuse and mislead us by false 
lights," he portrays himself as a pioneering laborer of the mind who, despite avowed shortcomings, 
has ventured into profound and precarious, yet likely provisional ruminations: "A man who works 
beyond the surface of things, though he may be wrong himself, yet he clears the way for others, and 
may chance to make even his errors subservient to the cause of truth" (54, my emphases). Exercising a 
sufficient remembrance in order, for instance, to identify the natural causes of beauty, can thus appear 
either as immediate and universal as reacting to a sudden sensation of excessive temperature or as time-
consuming and particular as examining sensations by means of a philosophical treatise. Moreover, 
Burke's scientific ambition of improving the standard of sufficient remembrance suggests that, despite 
his reliance on the idea of universal sensibility, Burke here allows that what he calls sensibility can be 
altered across or within generations and cultures and even individuals. Analogously, for Burke, taste, 
the most reliable of standards, would not only have to answer to another standard; it would itself be 
transformable. 
III.  The Three Aspects of Taste
　We can now further define Burke's conception of taste and explore the relation between it and 
sufficient remembrance. Burke appears to employ the word taste in three distinct ways. Its first 
signification is simply the sense of taste, as distinguished from the other four, conventionally understood 
senses. Burke employs this signification to exemplify the certainty that characterizes all senses by 
arguing that what is sour to one is sour to all others and that, moreover, everyone understands in 
the same way all metaphors that are based on this taste. Secondly, there is the signification of taste 
that concerns "those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgment of the 
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works of imagination and the elegant arts" (13); which is to say, sensibility and judgment. This is the 
broadest sense of taste; Burke feels that it has been treated imprecisely, thus leading to skepticism and 
indifference which, in turn, have contributed to its not being understood as well as "mere reason" (11-
12). In light of my analysis of sufficient remembrance, it is not surprising to find that there is a third 
signification of taste in the Introduction that offers, as it were, a reconciling link between sensibility 
and judgment, which faculties would otherwise be left at odds with one another. It is precisely Burke's 
original understanding of taste that serves to show that the determinations of the second faculty (judgment) 
are based on the unshakable principles of the first—sensibility in general, including the senses, properly 
speaking, and the realm of imagination—while remaining independent from them. Based on but 
independent from sensations: this interdependence is facilitated by sufficient remembrance. It accounts 
for what Tom Furniss calls Burke's "oscillation" between reliance on and distrust of fixed laws. We can 
locate this oscillation even in the first signification of taste (as one of five senses). Burke refers to taste 
as the most ambiguous of the five senses since its pleasures do not, like those of sight, "acquiesce in 
themselves," but are formed "by degrees, and by the force of . . . associations" (15). 
　The curious implication of taste's associative formation is that the sense of taste serves both as an 
exception to Burke's argument and as its privileged example. Certainty is derived from the universal 
and natural experience of taste, but taste, since it lacks autonomy and naturalness in its very formation, 
is at the same time an exception to the universally uniform experience of the senses. Burke's argument 
concerning the universally-recognized figurative import of "taste" only pushes this paradox a step 
further by making the universal character of taste depend upon the presumably universally understood 
metaphors that are drawn from it: "Here [when men taste various tastes] there is no diversity in their 
sentiments; and that there is not appears fully from the consent of all men in the metaphors which are 
taken from the sense of Taste" (14). This argument appears shortly after Burke's statement that, "[the] 
term Taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate: the thing which we understand 
by it, is far from a simple and determinate idea in the minds of most men, and it is therefore liable to 
uncertainty and confusion" (12, my emphasis). Such mistrust of figurative language does not prevent 
Burke from arguing for the universality of taste by claiming that figurative expressions involving the 
sense of taste are understood universally in the same way.
　Given this structure of being at once based on and independent from sensations, taste in the third 
signification not only encompasses aspects of taste understood as a sense (alongside the other senses) but 
also serves as the relation on the basis of which all debates concerning taste in the second signification 
(judgment) are waged and, ultimately, subject to regulation and consensus. It is with this nuanced 
approach to taste that Burke attempts to out-step the traditional skepticism in, among other possible 
areas, discussions of the arts. The debates over personal taste that had appeared hopelessly subjective 
and private can now be seen as based on, but not wholly reduced to, universally shared principles. 
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Rather than rest on an unqualified appeal to sensations, the resolution of differences in taste becomes a 
matter of the understanding or judgment insofar as judgment acts independently of the principles that 
serve as its grounding so as better to preserve these principles as its own ground. Assuming, then, along 
with Burke, that the taste (sensibility) of the participants in a debate is not damaged or corrupted, the 
"wrong taste" (poor judgment) is easily revealed by taste in the third signification as a deficiency of 
judgment. Consider that Burke allows for a defect of judgment that "may arise from a natural weakness 
of understanding . . . or, which is much more commonly the case, . . . from a want of proper and well-
directed exercise, which alone can make it strong and ready" (24). In cases where judgment itself proves 
untested or naturally weak, one needs to judge judgment as being one or the other and it appears that 
sufficient remembrance alone is capable of doing so. On this point, we recall that solving a debate over 
differences in taste is first a matter of determining who has more knowledge and experience in regard to 
a specific object. In Burke's own expression, "critical Taste does not depend upon a superior principle 
in men, but upon superior knowledge" (19). Superior knowledge, however, can be superior only insofar 
as, spurred on by the resemblance-happy enthusiasm of imagination, it exhibits both the remembrance 
of initiatory or originary sensations (available in equal proportions to all) and the capacity of distinction 
that characterizes judgment. This melding, which retains the differentiated and conflictual relation of the 
faculties, must rely on sufficient remembrance; it is the grounding of what Burke calls "Taste by way 
of distinction" or "Taste by consideration" (23, 26). Sufficient remembrance thus becomes synonymous 
with this third, mediating, and partially reconciling role that we find explicated by means of the elusive 
name "taste" (in the inclusive, third sense) and reveals that not only is judgment grounded on the 
common principles of sensibility, but that sensibility's common principles cannot be known as such but 
through the always retroactive or deferring action of judgment. In short, the faintest or purest sensation 
of taste entails mediation and conflict.  
　In light of the likeness between taste in the third sense and sufficient remembrance, many of the 
apparent or real contradictions in Burke's conception of the faculties can be viewed otherwise than as 
logical blunders or, as in Tom Furniss' discussion, symptoms of bourgeois ideology (although they may 
be seen to have elements of each of these). Sufficient remembrance helps to maintain and even gathers 
within itself, so as better to regulate, the conflictual, contradictory nature of the faculties. Burke's more 
or less happy solution to the paradoxical nature of taste maintains the fragile structure of the faculties by 
positing an infallible remembrance. 
　Although sensations are privileged in Burke's structural conception of the faculties, sensations alone 
provide neither an exclusive, infallible, nor reductive foundation for human emotions or passions. Thus, 
what some call Burke's "uncompromising" or "radical" sensationism is not entirely sensationist. The 
very term "sensationism" can lead to a simplistic view of a theory of passions whose conception of the 
faculties leaves sensations with an important but hardly autonomous role. If imagination, the second 
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faculty, is affected in every case precisely as our senses are, it is nonetheless sufficient remembrance that, 
by incorporating, mimicking, or even anticipating certain discriminating aspects of judgment, brings 
the conflicting faculties of sensibility and judgment into a productive relation. In this relation, judgment 
flourishes and continually refines itself through experience but, aided by sufficient remembrance, remains 
grounded in the unchanging and nearly universal principles of sensibility. To demonstrate this non-
facultative element's capacity to assure the faculties such a productive relation is the only way to account 
rigorously for the phenomenon by which, for Burke, taste can be regulated according to universally 
shared sensations despite its being continually educated and altered through customs, habits—in a word, 
associations. Burke's distinct conception leaves the faculties no less conflictual. Analyzing this notion 
of sufficient remembrance helps to single out the paradoxical status of taste as Burke conceives it: a 
non-faculty, it is nonetheless a reliable standard by which to regulate one's feelings. At the same time, 
however, it partakes in the discriminating powers of judgment and so, like judgment, can be altered. 
Through experience it can come into its own and be improved—or not. Thus, as a standard by which to 
regulate feelings, it is itself subject to regulation. As a reliable standard, it is itself subject to a standard 
(of sufficiency, if not also of strength). As that which keeps distinct the objects considered proper to 
judgment and imagination, respectively, it also keeps the ever-changing and corruptible assertions of 
judgment within reach of a standard that is deemed to be universal.
　We can now appreciate the interdependence of the faculties as it is marked in the preliminary 
definition of taste: "I mean by the word Taste no more than that faculty, or those faculties of the mind, 
which are affected with, or which form a judgment of the works of imagination and the elegant arts" 
(13). It is noteworthy that, given this, the "most general idea of the word," readers of Burke reduce the 
faculties to a purely receptive sensibility or to an "extreme empiricism" that "purchases its lucidity at 
the price of the notion of human freedom, as all human action is described as a mechanical response 
to external stimuli."6 By contrast with this assessment, we note that not only are all the "faculties of 
the mind" engaged, so as to be conceivable as a single faculty, but they are described as both receptive 
(sensibility) and formative and enterprising (judgment). Without the faculty of judgment, we are left with 
only a partial rendering of the general idea of taste. As for the emphasis on "works of imagination and 
the elegant arts" to which the faculties respond, Burke has been criticized for what Remy G. Saisselin 
calls his "naturalistic fallacy, or, the confusion of beauty in nature with beauty in art, a confusion made 
possible because of the positing of aesthetic pleasure on a sensationist philosophy."7 Saisselin sees in this 
very "confusion" the only real invention in British aesthetic theory of the eighteenth century. Whether 
or not his assessment concerning the history of aesthetics is a sound one, it is worth noting that the very 
fallacy Saisselin speaks of underscores an undeniable link between the notion of taste, the faculties, and 
the methodology of the Enquiry as a whole. My view is that the Enquiry's strength comes from its not 
limiting itself to aesthetics in a narrow sense—to a discourse on fine arts, founded on the ideas of beauty 
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and sublimity, or to one structured on a division between art and nature. It is not surprising, then, that, 
for Burke, the question of taste is a question of perception generally and that we find in the Enquiry 
passages that provide explicit guidelines for the operation of taste as sufficient remembrance, as Burke 
later named the operation in his Introduction on Taste. Consider, for instance, that in Part Three, which 
inquires primarily into objects of beauty that affect our passions, Section II, "Proportion not the cause of 
Beauty in Vegetables," Burke writes that, 
If proportion be one of the constituents of beauty, it must derive that power either from some 
natural properties inherent in certain measures, which operate mechanically; from the operation 
of custom; or from the fitness which some measures have to answer some particular ends of 
conveniency. (93) 
We can see how these categories relate to Burke's discussion of taste. The emphasis on the mechanical 
operation of natural properties refers to the properties' simplicity, autonomy, and naturalness. Rather than 
restrict our judgments to responding "mechanically" to sensations, they assure the arrival in sensibility of 
properties uncontaminated by secondary considerations. Custom and convenience, for their part, concern 
judgment eminently and it is sufficient remembrance that assists judgment, in this case, in identifying 
convenience as the real cause of the false idea, which is perpetuated through custom, that proportion is 
the cause of beauty in vegetables or animals. In another passage, Burke says that "if proportion does not 
operate by a natural power attending some measures, it must be either by custom, or the idea of utility; 
there is no other way" (101). To a surface reading, it would not appear that remembrance is involved 
in Burke's various depictions of his methodology (cf. 93-94); but, as we have seen, the identification 
and retention of the natural, as distinguished from custom, utility, and all other associations, requires a 
sufficient remembrance, one whose very sufficiency preserves the inquiry from the vagaries of customs, 
habits, and like associations. It helps one to locate natural objects that may participate in sameness or 
homogeneity with other natural objects and to respond to them accordingly (naturally). By incorporating 
or mimicking aspects of both sensibility and judgment while remaining distinct from each and, thus, 
essentially non-facultative, sufficient remembrance ensures that natural and original sensations are 
disjoined from associations. It is therefore an essential part of Burke's methodology. 
IV.  Understanding the Origin 
　We must now take into account the fact that in Section II of Part Three of the Enquiry Burke appears 
strained to exclude associations from natural pleasures. This section has been considered a point 
of collapse in Burke's "sensationist" argument, a point at which his "sensationist aesthetics" can no 
longer maintain a foundational exclusion of associations.8 As I will argue, in light of his conception 
of taste (i.e., the relations of the faculties and the nature of human experience), it is understandable 
Adamek：Taste and Memory in Edmund Burke's
─ 9 ─
that Burke's "rejection" of associations not appear categorical. The importance of this section, entitled 
"Association," is that it provides us with a new basis on which to question the role of remembrance and 
thus the nature of the origin to which it relates. The brief section, comprised of four sentences, begins 
with Burke showing less confidence in the power of sufficient remembrance to disentangle associations 
from original, natural pleasures when he remarks that, "besides such things as affect us in various 
manners according to their natural powers, there are associations made at that early season, which we 
find it very hard afterwards to distinguish from natural effects" (130)9.  For one, the imbalance of the 
faculties, sensibility's apparent predominance in an individual's early years, appears to have menacing 
consequences to the Enquiry itself. As a time of heightened sensibility and untested or undeveloped 
judgment, youth appears particularly vulnerable to associations. Can a universal standard of taste rely 
on a type of memory that, in certain passages of the Enquiry, is of one's earliest and, from an adult's 
perspective, most remote experiences? If remembrance upholds the structure of the faculties' relations, 
do these uncertainties not compromise the faculties' natural or nearly universal and thoroughly reliable 
character? Burke appears to have such questions in mind when he concedes that,
It is no small bar in the way of our enquiry into the cause of our passions, that the occasion of many 
of them are given, and that their governing motions are communicated at a time when we have not 
capacity to reflect on them, at a time of which all sort of memory is worn out of our minds. 10 (Ibid., 
my emphasis)
Burke here takes into account a developmental understanding of the faculties and, in particular, of 
judgment. What are the consequences of the fact that the origin appears to be recorded and retained 
at a time when judgment has not been strengthened; at a time, moreover, that remembrance would 
seem pressed to retain sufficiently? If what, today, is called infantile amnesia sets in, what happens 
to the years of stocking, for their reactivation and recombination, natural and original impressions? 
If they are lost as such, through a failure or weakness of memory, how could one disassociate them 
from subsequent habits or distempers, to preserve them from the realm of associations? Such natural 
and original impressions would appear impossible to retrieve but by association (in the modern, non-
Burkean sense of the word, but with the same implication that the origin would be lost in its simplicity, 
autonomy, and naturalness). Furthermore, although the standard of sufficient remembrance is described 
as common to all men, it would appear deficient among boys and girls or with respect to one's own 
youth. It is not until experience has informed, or formed, judgment that judgment takes advantage of 
the standard in order to legitimize its own assertions on the basis of sensibility's unwavering principles; 
that is, unless Burke would allow sufficient remembrance to make judgments independently and 
without respect for judgment itself—a possibility I will return to. Indeed, although the section from 
which this passage comes is read as an acknowledgment on Burke's part of the inevitable incursion of 
associations, what Burke seems most concerned with is the possibility of unregulated faculties. The 
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main question raised by Burke's evocation of the "early season" is this: once the memory of youth is 
worn out, is not also its very sufficiency, that is, the quality by virtue of which it secures the pertinence 
of imagination's common principles for the widely variable judgment and thereby lays the grounds for 
a rational treatment of critical taste? In the face of this question, and in a concluding gesture of this 
section that is often overlooked, Burke unflappably insists on the methodological necessity of seeking 
natural causes first. The prevalent sensationist portrait of the Enquiry, in which sensibility is supposed to 
reign supreme and unregulated, seeks its confirmation in a section that presumably marks sensationism's 
defeat, but Burke's concern here for the possible deficiency of judgment and memory only confirms 
the essential roles they play throughout the Enquiry. Indeed, rather than appear as an awkward or 
embarrassing concession to "associationism," the section appears to be directed at reconfirming Burke's 
methodological principle, which is to say, his quest for the natural origin. Burke's presumption is not 
that the natural causes must be assumed to be primary solely for expedient reasons; it is rather that this 
methodological choice is necessitated by the fact that the associative is derived from the natural. As a 
derivation, it would be inappropriate for it to be placed first; but, at the same time, it participates in the 
nature of that from which it must be excluded on methodological grounds and so its exclusion, however 
necessary or radical, cannot remove it from the continuum to which it belongs. In a way that accords 
with Burke's monotheistic metaphysics—his assumption that there is one nature or one arch--origin of 
all powers and passions—the associative, rather than appear separately, or from without, as a corruption 
or aberration or heterogeneous menace to the natural, finds the very source of its strength in the natural 
causes it threatens to obscure. Thus, Burke writes that "it would be absurd . . . to say that all things 
affect us by association only, since some things must have been originally and naturally agreeable or 
disagreeable, from which the others derive their associated powers" (130-131, my emphasis).11 In other 
words, all powers are by nature one, and we can recall in this respect the image Burke provides of God, 
the sovereign arch-origin of all passions, seated upon a throne, inaccessible to human inquiry (129). We 
can recall as well Burke's allowing for various passions to exhibit distinctions of degree, of measure, 
and of intensity, but never distinctions more substantial than that of the natural and the unnatural. At the 
same time, it follows that even the commanding distinction between the natural and the associative must 
be merely relative with respect to the arch-origin or arch-power. That is, even when Burke discusses 
the faculties as being radically distinct natural powers, he conceives them as being derived in different 
ways or at different removes from the power of God. Sensation and imagination would thus be deemed 
original and natural derivations, whereas judgment would be a derivation distant enough from the arch-
origin as to straddle the line between the natural and the unnatural. Although its operation is "simple" 
and its power is deemed "natural," judgment is too much of an acquired faculty, too much a product 
of experience, to be derived purely, simply, naturally, or, as Burke says of sensations, mechanically. 
Associations are thus merely derivations of natural sensations, which is to say, distant derivations of so 
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many origins which themselves derive from a single arch-origin. 
　Burke's reflections on the "early season" compel us to return again to the analysis of sufficient 
remembrance. Either remembrance as it appears in youth or in inexperienced individuals—assuming it 
does—suffers from a lack of judgment, is thereby rendered deficient, and thus, despite Burke's efforts to 
make them appear valid, the universal grounds for taste are no longer assured; or sufficient remembrance 
exhibits powers of distinction known to characterize judgment while not, in fact, requiring judgment's 
full development in order to exhibit these powers. It would thus be like judgment in a certain respect 
but remain independent from it and, being steadfast and ever-present, even predate judgment. In this 
light, sufficient remembrance would be a kind of judgment before the faculty of judgment is formed. 
As curious as this implication may appear, only with such autonomy for sufficient remembrance could 
Burke's universalist conception of taste escape debilitating contradiction. Sufficient remembrance would 
thus appear to be sufficiently self-sufficient to draw distinctions infallibly between the natural and the 
acquired, whether or not one's judgment is sufficiently formed by experience. This aspect of sufficient 
remembrance necessarily implies that, whatever it is, it is autonomous and distinct from the faculties. 
　However, to this option between, on the one hand, an infallible and timeless remembrance that 
operates irrespectively of the faculties and, on the other, a remembrance that founders on the oblivions 
of youth, a third possibility opens up, one that is discernable in my reflections on the multiple origins of 
which God is deemed the ultimate source. This possibility is that the origin cannot be rigorously tied to 
youth or to an individual's history. Although Burke appears to rest many of his arguments on empirical 
observations, as in his assumption that children never seem to enjoy tobacco in their first experience of 
it, and elsewhere, as in the opening elegiac homage to youthful sensibility, on apparently foundational 
or proto-typical examples of youthful experiences of natural pleasures or displeasures (25, 31), certain 
passages suggest that a natural pain or pleasure can be experienced "originally" and recognized as 
such at any age, and even that all natural passions must be touched off or accompanied by a degree 
of "originality," that is, an encounter with the origin. This is how I understand Burke's statement, in a 
passage where Burke contrasts the experience of novelty with that of associative custom or habit, that 
"[s]ome degree of novelty must be one of the materials in every instrument which works upon the mind, 
and curiosity blends itself more or less with all our passions" (31). Originality is tied throughout the 
Enquiry to youthfulness, but this passage in particular shows originality to be not simply the privileged 
terrain of youth but in fact a tenacious, universal category of experience. The passage thus exhibits the 
interdependence of the conflictual faculties since, to apply itself to works of art and strengthen itself, 
judgment depends on the enthusiasms of curiosity, an active commerce in resemblances, and a lively 
sensibility; which is to say, on the faculties its distinctions dampen and obstruct, but never wholly defeat 
(24-25). In other words, even if youth is depicted in certain passages as a privileged time of exposure 
to the origin, the inquiry into the origin of natural original pains and pleasures takes place regardless 
─ 12 ─
鹿児島県立短期大学紀要　第62号（2011）
of the age of those affected. It is no wonder, then, that Burke's quest for the origin looks nothing like a 
childhood autobiography or investigation into others' youthful experiences.
　The experience of the origin thus calls upon the spontaneity and immediacy that, as necessary 
components of experience, squarely place the origin, and thus remembrance, in everyday experience. 
This spontaneously encountered origin modulates the problematic status of sufficient remembrance 
since, for reasons that Burke's text implies and despite Burke's necessary recourse to originality, 
originality cannot function as a self-sufficient value. The essential tension within Burke's conception of 
taste is due not simply to a quaint or naїve insistence on "naturalness" or to an injudicious or slovenly 
concession to a competing school of thought known as associationism. This is so because, in the first 
case, "nature" in Burke has to be thought in tandem with the idea of the "origin," and, in the second, 
the apparent concession to associations is only provisional and rhetorical in nature. The tension occurs 
at the implicit but decisive melding of the categories of remembrance and originality. It resides in the 
fact that the relations of the faculties are upheld by a remembrance that itself is charged with repeating, 
infallibly and without fragmentation or residue, a spontaneously recurring origin. However, for this 
very reason, the simple, natural, autonomous, immediate and reliable access to the origin is denied. 
Whether undistinguished or forgotten in youth, or captured in its immediacy by repetitive remembrance, 
the origin disrupts any presumed automaticity of the faculties from without at the same time that it 
upholds their relations. Therefore, even if we wished to portray sensibility's access to originality as an 
unadulterated, unperturbed, and sovereign foundation, we would have to allow that sensibility in all 
cases requires the retroactive or deferring action of a sufficient remembrance to preserve its unshakable 
principles. It is sufficient remembrance that isolates what is original and natural and allows it to be 
experienced as such. Thus, by implication, at no age, whether for the individual or the community, is 
there a direct, immediate, or thoroughly original experience of sensations. The origin cannot precede its 
remembrance. Regulation, retention, preservation, repetition, remembrance: these are different names 
we have encountered for the obstacle of mediation that enervates supposedly sovereign sensibility. To 
skirt the omnipresence of habit-ensconced associations, taste relies upon the necessarily deferred nature 
of a remembrance of original sensations. And we have seen how deferred this action can be, insofar as 
the Enquiry itself exercises or produces sufficient remembrance. Thus, for example, if sight, as Burke 
argues, acquiesces in itself (as opposed to touch or taste, which, he says, are formed by degrees), 
to be fully experienced as self-acquiescence and thus be distinguishable from the gradual and thus 
compromised acquiescence of associations, sight nonetheless requires, like the other conventionally 
understood senses, the deferring regulation of remembrance. This would perhaps allow us to account for 
the fact that Burke describes sight with metaphors of touch or as if sight were a tactile operation. Touch 
would more effectively mark a self-acquiescence that is, like all senses, mediated. Be that as it may, the 
physiological validity that some may grant this distinction between sight and taste is thus compromised 
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by the necessarily retroactive or deferring operation of sufficient remembrance. Moreover, this operation 
holds even if the association is in force from one's first days of life or if it is made only once, as in the 
incidentally pleasurable sensation provided by a particular medicine. 
　Given what we have noted concerning the everydayness of the origin, it is understandable that Burke 
recognizes the raison d'être of the regulating operation of sufficient remembrance in its "maintain[ing] 
the ordinary correspondence of life" (11). Thus, in a logic that repeats itself throughout the Enquiry 
and even characterizes the Enquiry as such, sufficient remembrance strives to maintain that which is 
presumed to be inalterable; it is thus a thoroughly conservative action designed to answer to and preserve 
what is deemed ordinary and common to everyday existence. This emphasis on the conservation of the 
everyday correspondence of life could certainly be tied to the monotheistic metaphysics that pervades 
the Enquiry and, in particular, to the assertions that Burke makes concerning the divine arch-origin of all 
passions, namely "the throne of God himself" that "can never be unraveled by any industry of ours" (129). 
In keeping with Christian dogma, this arch-origin is irretrievable by any human industry or capacity, 
remembrance included, and that is why Burke says that he limits his Enquiry to "the immediately 
sensible qualities of things" (130). Sufficient remembrance is held within the limits of the sensible at 
the same time that it is called upon to distinguish within the sensible natural and associated sensations. 
In this sense, sufficient has a restrictive, apologetic, or even devout connotation: it is sufficient because 
it exposes fixed, natural principles while falling short of revealing—instead of which it posits as a 
principle of faith—the existence of the arch-original causes of pleasure and pain. It is sufficient in all 
things save for the comprehension of God. Thus, the Enquiry would have been written in remembrance 
of God, while necessarily falling short of bringing God into view.
　Peter De Bolla's reading of section V, "On Power," also interrogates the theological undercurrent 
of the Enquiry12 and provides a number of substantive analogies or similarities with my reading of 
remembrance. De Bolla's assessing the Enquiry "in its own terms as a legitimating and legislating 
theory," leads him, firstly, to emphasize the role of "godhead" as the "hinge of articulation or foundation 
stone of the entire system" (Discourse of the Sublime, 63). As with "sufficient remembrance" in the 
Introduction on Taste, this foundation was not made explicit until the second edition, which is also when 
the section "On Power" was added. De Bolla writes of this addition that, "[w]here before the theory 
had been primarily about the origin and causes of the sublime, it now comes close to a theory that itself 
might produce sublimity. In this way it enters into the distance of the sublime" (ibid.). De Bolla argues 
that Burke tries to create an all-inclusive theoretical discourse that ties ultimate power to God, but 
unintentionally allows discourse to reemerge as a force that produces the sublime and thus liberates itself 
from its subordinate role to God. In short, discourse trumps divine power: "In the final analysis power 
neither resides in the outer world, nor is Burke's attempt to claim that the final resting place of power is 
godhead fully convincing, for the power that is articulated is fundamentally a function of the discourse 
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of analysis, its power to name power."13 Thus, at one angle of Peter De Bolla's reading, the standard of 
the arts that Burke seeks becomes a will to power on the part of subjectivity. The discourse-producing 
subject circumscribes God with its power to name and thus brings into its power the ability to produce 
and control the sublime. This kernel of rational control is precisely what I have analyzed with respect 
to remembrance. The tensions recognized by De Bolla with respect to power mark the Enquiry as a 
work of remembrance. God is for Burke that which injects the origin into the everyday correspondence 
of life while remaining at an inaccessible remove, "stretched to a degree far exceeding the bounds of 
our comprehension" (68). And, as always, it is a question of degree only, and judgment, the faculty that 
draws distinctions of degree, is summoned to render sufficiently that which properly exceeds its own 
powers. Thus, however overwhelming or inaccessible, God is submitted to the regulation of the faculties. 
In the very passage where the vastness and grandeur of God are said to annihilate us, Burke details 
the respective roles of judgment and sensibility—in that order—in the contemplation of God: "Some 
reflection, some comparing is necessary to satisfy us of his wisdom, his justice, and his goodness; to be 
struck with his power, it is only necessary that we should open our eyes" (ibid.). The oscillations that 
mark taste, that mark a sufficient remembrance of the origin, mark equally one's relation to the divine 
arch-power or arch-origin.  
　In pressing Burke on these conceptions of the origin, I am perhaps only remarking that at all times, 
the faculties must be regulated. Regulating one's feelings according to the standard of sufficient 
remembrance means accounting for the common principles which one's feelings either conform to (when 
the sensation is natural), or breach (when unnatural). In modern criticism, this regulating structure is 
rarely emphasized and, in its place, one finds the portrait of Burke, the "radical sensationist." Some 
of the readings that rely on this portrait see Burke's Enquiry as a groundbreaking discourse of the 
body that constitutes a classical aesthetic tradition that is still alive today in all attempts to analyze the 
"politics of the body" (Terry Eagleton); others see it as solipsistic (Francis Ferguson). It is perhaps worth 
remarking that, in my own reading, I have not denied the possibility that there may be good reasons for 
linking Burke's methodology to a history of sensationalism or for calling his theory of the passions an 
"aesthetics." I have not argued against the common view that Burke's Enquiry is empiricist, since, to 
a large degree, it is. The claim I advance is that, despite its apparent offhandedness or insignificance, 
Burke's reference to a universal standard of sufficient remembrance constitutes a problematic attempt at 
grounding the whole conceptual framework of the Enquiry. If understood in this way, taste, through its 
reliance on memory and on the interplay of the faculties, cannot be merely sensationist, since judgments 
of taste are not merely the product of physical sensations. Rather, they derive from stable memories of 
sensations that, as such, make possible the interrelations of the various faculties of the mind.   
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